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Shelby and the Sisyphean Struggle for Black Enfranchisement
By Rick Valelly
In the blockbuster of 2013, Shelby v. Holder, the Supreme Court’s conservative
majority washed its hands of a half century of voting rights jurisprudence.
Previously, the Court often revised parts of the statute, but always with the
premise that the statute’s building blocks are constitutional. Actions by the
Court in turn would set the agenda of Congress. Congress would respond to
judicial decisions when it brought the Act up for renewal (in 1970, 1975, 1982,
and 2006.) On those occasions, Congress strengthened or ratified those judicial
alterations that improved the Act, and Congress overrode judicial adjustments
that Congress saw as weakening the Act. Either way, Congress and the Court
collaboratively perpetuated the Act with a minimum of inter-branch conflict.
Neither side fundamentally re-thought or rejected the statute. The Court
accorded deference to Congress because the Constitution plainly states that
Congress enforces the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, which are
the foundation of national voting rights law. But that consensus and
collaboration are now gone.
The Court’s conservative majority has thus changed the agendas and political
tasks of other players with a stake in voting rights. They include liberal voting
rights lawyers affiliated with such organizations as the NAACP-Legal Defense
Fund and the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights. But the most consequential
player is the Democratic party – the party that largely developed the Voting
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Rights Act. It now faces the problem of how best to make good on its 2012 party
platform stance: “We believe the right to vote and to have your vote counted is
an essential American freedom…Democrats have a proud history of standing up
for the right to vote.”1 The problem is that a major (and unacknowledged)
partner in establishing and perpetuating the Voting Rights Act – the Republican
party -- is no longer available.
Republicans hardly oppose minority voting rights in principle. But they are
now committed to screening the eligible electorate through tests and devices that
supposedly prevent in-person voter fraud in registration and voting. These go
under the catchall term of “voter ID” legislation. Republicans appear to believe
that registration and voting are vulnerable to fraudulent management of voter
registration drives by groups that affiliate with Democrats, such as the now
defunct advocacy group ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for
Reform Now.)
During its first term, the Obama Administration correctly insisted on federal
scrutiny of voter ID in states that are covered by the Voting Rights Act, such as
South Carolina and Texas. Under the language of the statute, “tests and devices”
that affect registration and voting cannot go into effect if there is credible
evidence that they may impair the right to vote. But that enforcement effort by
the Obama Administration had a political cost. It stripped the VRA of bipartisan
support. Suddenly brought to bear against voter ID, the VRA metamorphosed –
or so it seemed to Republicans -- into a partisan instrument.
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Republicans consequently have little appetite for joining with Democrats to

find some way to overrule the Supreme Court’s Shelby decision. In 2006, both
political parties joined forces to renew the VRA. Republicans and Democrats
agreed so much, in fact, that they overruled two previous Court decisions that
had narrowed how the VRA regulated the drawing of voter districts.
Now most congressional Republicans – and certainly all Southern Republicans
-- are too invested in their party’s vigorous effort to reduce the risk of voter fraud
in American elections. Although in-person voter fraud hardly exists in the
United States, Republicans insist that the electoral process must not have any
hint of such fraud. Often pointing to opinion surveys that back them, they hold
that the public wants voter ID because citizens want to be absolutely certain of
the integrity of the electoral process.
As the 2012 Republican platform stated, “Honest elections are the foundation
of representative government… we applaud legislation to require photo
identification for voting and to prevent election fraud, particularly with regard to
registration and absentee ballots. We support State laws that require proof of
citizenship at the time of voter registration to protect our electoral system against
a significant and growing form of voter fraud. Every time that a fraudulent vote
is cast, it effectively cancels out a vote of a legitimate voter. Voter fraud is
political poison. It strikes at the heart of representative government. We call on
every citizen, elected official, and member of the judiciary to preserve the
integrity of the vote. We call for vigorous prosecution of voter fraud at the State
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and federal level. To do less disenfranchises present and future generations.”2
Democrats, for their part, regard voter ID as transparently intended to help
Republicans win elections by selectively disenfranchising voters that are likely to
vote Democratic. Many voters currently lack the resources to meet the new
requirements and procedures that are being rolled out in voter ID states, and in
the more restrictive states – such as North Carolina and Texas – certain groups of
voters, such as college students and African-Americans -- will find it impossible
to register and to vote as they done previously. They may well be able to adjust
their plans or to acquire the documentation that they need. But in the meantime
they are being asked to bear the costs of making the electoral process as “pure”
as possible – and that strikes Democrats as outrageous.3 Thus the voting rights
section of the 2012 presidential platform further stated, “During the Obama
administration, the Justice Department has initiated careful, thorough, and
independent reviews of proposed voting changes, and it has prevented states
from implementing voter identification laws that would be harmful to minority
voters. Democrats know that voter identification laws can disproportionately
burden young voters, people of color, low-income families, people with
disabilities, and the elderly, and we refuse to allow the use of political pretexts to
disenfranchise American citizens.”
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How The Stalemate Highlights American Exceptionalism
In short, Shelby and its aftermath compose a complex standoff. The Supreme
Court elevated the constitutional priority of protecting federalism -- and it
simultaneously demoted both the priority of voting rights protection and the
scope of congressional power to implement the 14th and 15th Amendments. The
Court effectively rebuked Congress for not knowing how to do its job under the
enforcement provisions of the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution.
The Court could not have broken off its long-standing partnership with Congress
to make the Voting Rights Act work in a more spectacular way.
But new disagreements between the political parties about election
administration and voter qualifications clearly signify that bipartisan cooperation
to override the Court – which had always been available earlier and as recently
as 2006 – is not in the cards. Voter ID and the VRA have become intertwined.
Meanwhile, a host of state legislative changes have generated considerable
uncertainty about whether voters in previously covered states will have their
access to the ballot impaired in 2014 and 2016.
In comparative perspective, this is all quite astonishing. The United States
pioneered mass suffrage in the 1820s, foreshadowing similar change in other
regimes in both the Old World and the New. The prospect of peering into the
future brought Tocqueville to America, and led to one of his masterpieces,
Democracy in America.
But the United States also pioneered voting rights politics – that is, a politics of
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picking winners and losers in who has access to the ballot box. The 1820s saw the
simultaneous disfranchisement of both women and free African-Americans even
as state legislatures engineered the enfranchisement of property less adult white
males. Nearly two centuries later Americans are still divided by voting rights
politics.
Indeed, the U.S. might be considered an unusual case: in cross-national
perspective it is both an early and a late developer in universal voting rights. The
road that led to Shelby – and the consequences that the decision has already had –
underscore this central truth about American voting rights politics. The United
States is still struggling with universal suffrage.
“Voting wars” – to use Rick Hasen’s superb term – are not unique to the
United States.4 But our current “voting war” is remarkably robust. And the risk
that it poses to African-Americans’ and other minorities’ voting rights, while
hardly as great as in the past, is nonetheless non-trivial. Given the length of the
struggle for black enfranchisement, and the fact that the struggle has left its
imprint on the Constitution in three places – the 14th, 15th, and the 24th
Amendments – this continued uncertainty in the security of the black vote is selfevidently remarkable.
In the rest of this essay, I sketch the evolution of the Voting Rights Act with
particular attention to how it became vulnerable to a decision like Shelby. Then I
describe the majority opinion in the case, drawing out its very strong emphases
on the requirements of federalism and its depiction of the 2006 renewal as
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irrational. The Court’s minority opinion, which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
wrote, warned that the majority was making a mistake in picturing Congress as
botching voting rights enforcement. Congress knew what it was doing, and the
Court did not. For supporters of the voting rights struggle, Ginsburg’s
suggestion appears to have been vindicated by ensuing events in previously
covered states. Controversial and widely publicized voter ID responses to the
decision have emerged in North Carolina and Texas.
I conclude with reflections on how Shelby illuminates the development of
American democracy. Whether we need to seriously doubt American
democracy’s development clearly seems alarmist. But American political history
certainly suggests that some concern about what may happen next to the
democratic gains brought about by the Voting Rights Act is not misplaced.
Given everything that has happened with the struggle for black enfranchisement
that fact is, not to put too fine a point on it, simply astounding.

The Design and Evolution of the Voting Rights Act
When Congress enacted the VRA in 1965 it implemented two parts of the
Constitution. It enforced the 15th Amendment: “The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. The
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”
The VRA also enforced the first section of the 14th Amendment, which forbids

	
  

8	
  

states from denying citizens “the equal protection of the laws.” This prohibition
has come to mean that legislation infected with animus against a minority is
impermissible. Evidence of such animus can consist of either invidious
statements of purpose by legislators, or by administrators who apply a law, or a
clear showing that the law or rule systematically disadvantage minorities. With
respect to election law, the bottom line is that state and local governments cannot
impair, much less block, the right to vote of minorities.
But here is where policy design was crucial. Constitutional principles are one
thing, giving them teeth is another. In 1965 Congress wanted to devise a statute
that would work immediately in stopping Southern state and local governments
from discriminating against black voters – and that would also keep working
regardless of how these governments tried to get around the Act. The 1957 and
1960 Civil Rights Acts, which were voting rights statutes, had turned out to be
easy for Southern state and local governments to get around because the
enforcement of those statutes fell to government lawyers. They went to the
federal courts to block discriminatory behavior by local elections officials.
Government lawyers tried to prove that local registrars in a Deep South state
deliberately discriminated against black voters. They might succeed in
persuading a judge – they might. But most of the judges had been selected by
southern Democratic U.S. senators, thanks to senatorial courtesy in federal
judicial appointments, and thus were generally hostile to the government
lawyers. And even if the lawyers from Washington won in a local federal district
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court or on appeal to the circuit court for the South, the Fifth Circuit, local
registrars would then simply do something new. To give a hypothetical
scenario, a county registrar might add hours of operation, in response to a
judicial order. But simultaneously he might also require all voters on the county
rolls to prove that they actually lived where they said they lived, and in the
meantime he would purge the voting rolls and require re-registration, allowing
him to challenge black voters as they tried to re-register.
So Congress needed to figure out some system for stopping such constant
moving of the goal posts. What it decided to do was to create an administrative
system run out of the Department of Justice (DOJ) -- and to require jurisdictions
that had a history of discriminating against minorities to send any proposed
changes to Washington or the federal district court for the District of Columbia –
either one would do – for what came to be called pre-clearance. This is the scheme
established by Section 5 of the VRA. It is known as “Section 5 pre-clearance.”
Under pre-clearance, proposed changes to the rules would be sent to
Washington, and the Department of the Justice or the Washington court would
have a certain amount of time to review the change sent to it. If there was
something objectionable about the change then DOJ or the court would ask for
more information about it. If it was quite clear that a discriminatory scheme was
afoot then DOJ or the court would block the change and put the burden on the
jurisdiction of explaining to a 3-judge federal court what its intentions were, with
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the Justice Department having the option, if it lost at that level, of immediate
review by the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, the United States directly registered thousands of black voters in
1965 and 1966 and it sent elections observers to watch elections. Right away
there was considerable change on the ground -- and the surge in black voter
registration was permanent because states and local governments no longer
could turn to clever new rules that would roll back the registration gains.
This system of supervising most of the South was initially meant to be
temporary – the plan would work, it was thought, in five years. But it was
renewed in 1970 and again in 1975 – and then again in 1982. During such
renewals two new things happened. One was that Native-American and Latino
voters were brought into the preclearance system, so parts of South Dakota and
all of Texas, for example, got added to the list of covered jurisdictions, as did
New York City.
Also in 1982 Congress said that voters in the jurisdictions that were covered
by the Act were entitled to have elected officials that they preferred. It did so by
amending and expanding Section 2: “A violation…is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open
to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by…this section in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
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[emphasis added] The extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which
may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion
in the population.”5 This change was meant to curb what was called “vote
dilution.” A local jurisdiction in the South might be majority white but also have
a very large black minority population -- and thus very likely have a long history
of racial tension. If all of the seats for its representative bodies were elected “at
large” and if whites voted in a bloc, then the school board, county commission,
or city council would always be dominated by whites. But the Act now said that
minority voters were entitled to remedies for such vote dilution.
Section 2, which is permanent, interacted with Section 5 preclearance. Via the
pre-clearance process, many covered jurisdictions changed over to elections by
wards or precincts. Additionally, state legislative and congressional districts
had to be drawn by state legislatures in ways that gave minority voters genuine
influence in state-legislative and U.S. House elections. Vote dilution in these
elections had often been accomplished by such devices as “cracking” and
“packing:” that is, creating districts that allocated small fractions of black voters
among many districts (cracking) or stuffing black voters into districts (packing),
thereby ensuring at most token representation in the state legislature or the U.S.
House. These practices disappeared, and instead state legislatures, civil rights
interest groups, election lawyers and the Department of Justice collectively
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negotiated plans that were fairer. There were inevitable disagreements about
what fairness actually required – and even whether this was a kind of affirmative
action program for state legislatures and the U.S. House.6 But the overall
intention of amending Section 2, which was to disrupt a white racial monopoly
on office holding, was fulfilled.

The 2006 Renewal of the Voting Rights Act
In short, the VRA’s evolution is a clear success story. Black voting increased
and so did black office holding. In fact, black office holding became normal by
the 1990s. Its normalization was a pre-condition for the successful presidential
candidacy of Barack Obama.
Yet such success by itself inevitably raised the possibility that the Act was
obsolete. A more subtle way in which the Act’s evolution generated the
appearance of obsolescence lay in the renewals. Let me now return to the
renewals -- 1970, 1975, 1982, and most recently 2006 – a cycle which the reader
has surely remarked.
Why the renewals? Recall that in principle the Act is temporary. The default
setting behind the Act’s special provisions is state control over electoral
qualifications. But that can only happen if Congress concludes that there is no
need for federal supervision. In 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006, Congress focused on
whether there was strong evidence of continuing problems for minority voters in
the covered jurisdictions. In all cases it found enough evidence of resistance to
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minority voting rights to generate bipartisan coalitions in favor of renewal. In
each case, a Republican president agreed with the congressional determination.
In 2006, when Congress renewed the Act again for another 25 years, it did so
by large majorities. The vote on final passage in the U.S. House was 390-33, and
the Senate passed it without any dissent, 98-0. When he signed the 2006 renewal,
President George W. Bush stated, “In four decades since the Voting Rights Act
was first passed, we've made progress toward equality, yet the work for a more
perfect union is never ending. We'll continue to build on the legal equality won
by the civil rights movement… Today, we renew a bill that helped bring a
community on the margins into the life of American democracy. My
administration will vigorously enforce the provisions of this law, and we will
defend it in court. This legislation is named in honor of three heroes of American
history who devoted their lives to the struggle of civil rights: Fannie Lou Hamer,
Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King. And in honor of their memory and their
contributions to the cause of freedom, I am proud to sign the Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006.”7
Yet there was also great skepticism in the air about whether the 2006 renewal
was symbolic, that is, a case of both parties wanting to conspicuously show that
they stood for minority voting rights. Abigail Thernstrom, who is today vicechair of the United States Civil Rights Commission, had long taken the view that
the Act over-regulated the electoral process. In an article published by the
Federalist Society, a conservative legal advocacy group, Thernstrom criticized
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the Act, claiming that the renewal was done in a “clear political panic.”8 More
surprising was the sharp discontent of such liberal election lawyers as New York
University’s Richard Pildes. About a year after Thernstrom’s essay, Pildes wrote:
“Congress largely avoided facing the difficult policy issues…it ratified a
regionally specific status quo that had been in place for the last twenty-five years,
then locked that status quo into place for another twenty-five years to come…I
have always thought that unanimous legislation is, paradoxically, the most
problematic; it frequently signifies either that Congress is engaged in little more
than credit-claiming, symbolic legislation, or when serious issues are at stake,
that Congress has simply crafted a way to evade them.”9
One source of such misgivings was the recycling of the coverage formula that
Congress created in 1975, that it retained in 1982, and that it retained yet again in
2006. The original 1965 coverage formula singled out jurisdictions that employed
a “test or device” for voter registration, such as a literacy test, and that registered
fewer than 50% of the voting age adults (as determined by the Director of the
Census) or in which fewer than 50% of voting age adults voted in the November,
1964 presidential elections. At the 1970 renewal the benchmark election date was
changed to the 1968 presidential election. In 1975, the benchmark date became
the 1972 presidential election. After that, the coverage formula did not change,
either in 1982 or in 2006.10 Small wonder that commentators such as Pildes could
see this decision as avoiding the difficult task of updating the statute.
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Those who approved of the 2006 renewal argued, however, that the old

coverage formula was still needed even though the covered jurisdictions seemed
quite different. The Voting Rights Act only looked obsolete. In fact there was
considerable evidence, they believed, that the Section 4 formula prevented
backsliding. Also, the Constitution is clear: Congress enforces the 14th and 15th
amendments “by appropriate legislation.”
The key term in doubt, of course, was “appropriate.” But who decided
appropriateness? The answer seemed to be Congress. Soon, however, the
Supreme Court spoke up as well.

The Invitation From the Court That Congress Declined
In a 2009 case from Texas, an unimportant political subdivision with an
elected board, the Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One (or
NAMUDNO), challenged the constitutionality of Section 5. NAMUDNO was a
covered district required to submit to preclearance. It objected to the
requirement, for it had no history of racial discrimination in its elections. It
simply happened to be covered under Section 4. The anti-VRA lawyers who
brought the case before the Court wanted a way to clearly demonstrate the Act’s
obsolescence.11
Writing for the Court, and also attracting 7 other justices to the opinion, the
Chief Justice established that Section 5 was an unusually powerful intrusion into
the prerogatives of subnational governments. That intrusion in fact had always
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raised constitutional concerns among members of the Court. Section 5 tampered
with the “equal sovereignty” of the states and raised “federalism concerns.”
Moreover, the coverage formula appeared out of date, and Congress had ignored
warnings that it was out of date (and here Chief Justice Roberts cited the
congressional testimony of Richard Pildes.) However, the 15th Amendment
“empowers ‘Congress,’ not the Court, to determine in the first instance what
legislation is needed…” The Court ought not to overstep itself. Because it was
possible to find a statutory basis for resolving the case – and thus avoid reaching
the question of Section 5’s constitutionality – the Court was obliged to do that.
To be sure, this meant re-casting and amending Section 4 so that NAMUDNO
could avail itself of what is known as “bail-out.” That is, NAMUDNO could
escape future Section 5 pre-clearance obligations by demonstrating that it had no
record of invidious electoral administration. Under the circumstances, it made
sense for the Court to coalesce behind this “amend the meaning of Section 4”
option – even though Associate Justice Clarence Thomas urged the Court (in his
lone dissent) to reach the constitutional question.
This was a startling signal from the Court. As the Yale law professor Heather
Gerken wrote, “Yesterday the Supreme Court wrote a cliffhanger of an opinion
on the constitutionality of Section of the Voting Rights Act…the Court raised
serious questions about Section 5’s future, but it didn’t pull the trigger. The
question is how the story will end.”12 Eight out of 9 justices essentially agreed
that it was quite possible that the statute was obsolete. But because there was a
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way for the Court to then avoid judging whether the 2006 renewal was in fact
“appropriate legislation” the Court would take that less controversial path
forward.
Informed observers took the ruling to be a plain suggestion to Congress that it
ought to revisit the 2006 renewal, or at least to come up with amendments or
legislative solutions that addressed the Court’s concerns. After all, the
Constitution gives Congress the power, not the Court, to enforce the Act. It
should do just that – especially when a decision is an 8-1 decision.
But Congress did nothing in response. Why? Those who dislike the 2006
renewal hold that Congress could not revisit the Act because in reality there was
no bipartisan consensus for fundamentally revising and updating it. During the
2006 renewal the lack of a substantive consensus on how best to modernize the
Act was papered over. The liberal civil rights groups and election lawyers who
were satisfied with, indeed deeply invested in, the status quo essentially wrote
the renewal for Congress -- and neither political party had a mind to challenge
their handiwork. At least the civil rights establishment offered a plan forward in
2006 with the renewal, and everyone was happy to accept the plan. Everyone
preferred some renewal to the awkwardness of no renewal, so they held their
noses and voted more or less unanimously for a poorly done job.
Such an analysis goes over well with those who think Congress is a bankrupt
institution, deservedly despised by the American public. But of course Congress
is not a bankrupt institution. One can easily think of two good explanations for

	
  

18	
  

why Congress did not act. The first is that the congressional consensus in favor
of the renewal was not simply a feel- good hurrah for black voting rights but
instead a considered decision. The second is that Congress was extremely busy
in 2009 with the Democratic party’s reform agenda, which included health care
reform and financial regulatory reform, to say nothing of the required agenda of
authorization and appropriations for existing federal programs.
In the end, Congress did not act. But supporters of the Voting Rights Act
remained quite nervous. On its face, Section 4 relied on criteria for targeting
jurisdictions that were, in 2009, 34 years old, and dated to the 1975 renewal. In
turn, these 1975 yardsticks captured political realities that existed in 1972. Were
the covered jurisdictions really frozen in political amber? Four years later, as
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court in Shelby proved, supporters of
voting rights were right to be nervous about the glare of obsolescence that
Section 4 appeared to give off.

The Shelby Decision
Shelby County had sued the Attorney General in the Federal District Court in
Washington, DC for objecting to election law changes that it had made, and it
asked the District Court to declare that the coverage criteria of Section 4 and
Section 5 were “facially unconstitutional.” Writing again for the Court in a major
voting rights case, Chief Justice Roberts briskly got down to suggesting that
nothing less than a proper relationship between federalism and the enforcement
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of voting rights was at stake.13 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was “a drastic
departure from the basic principles of federalism.” Also Section 4 applied
Section 5 to some states but not others, making it “an equally dramatic departure
from the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.” Thus two key sections
of the Act conflicted with the normal practice of federalism. When Congress first
wrote the Act such exceptions were urgently needed. Congress then renewed
the statute in 1970, 1975, and 1982, and the Court supported “each of these
reauthorizations.” But then came the 2006 renewal – and NAMUDNO, that is,
the case in which “we expressed serious doubts about the Act’s continued
constitutionality.” These doubts, expressed in 2009, were due to the “‘substantial
federalism costs’” and to the prospect of continued differentiation among the
states despite the cardinal principle of “equal sovereignty.” “Eight members of
the Court subscribed to these views…” At that time the Court concluded that “‘a
departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a
showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to
the problem that it targets.’” That perspective governed, Roberts wrote, how the
Court viewed the claim brought by Shelby County, Alabama. Roberts then
proceeded to discuss the virtues of federalism – in particular how it “‘secures to
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power’” – and reemphasized, yet again, the equal sovereignty of the states and their customary
control of election law. He repeated, as well, that the Voting Rights Act was
“‘extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system.’”
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Having emphasized federalism as essential to American democracy, Roberts

then turned to the Act’s necessity. It was in keeping with the needs of the time.
“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.” Voter turnout and
black office holding in “covered jurisdictions” were robust, “in large part because
of the Voting Rights Act.” [emphasis in the original] “The Act has proved
immensely successful at redressing racial discrimination and integrating the
voting process…Yet the Act has not eased the restrictions in § 5 or narrowed the
scope of the coverage formula…along the way…These extraordinary and
unprecedented features were reauthorized as if nothing had changed.” Roberts
proceeded to dissect and dismiss the federal government’s defense of the
reauthorization. “But a more fundamental problem remains: Congress did not
use the record it compiled to shape a coverage formula grounded in current
conditions. It instead reenacted a formula based on 40-year old facts having no
logical relation to the present day.” Roberts proceeded then to rebuke the
dissenters from the majority opinion (led by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg),
pointing out that two of them had joined the majority in the NAMUDNO
decision, and to the decision’s expression of concerns about the Act. He noted
that “the dissent refuses to consider the principle of equal sovereignty, despite
Northwest Austin’s emphasis on its significance.” He reiterated that the Court, in
2009, voiced “concerns about the constitutionality of the Act. Congress could
have updated the coverage formula at that time, but did not do so. Its failure to
act leaves us today with no choice but to declare §4(b) unconstitutional. The
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formula in that section can longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to
preclearance.”
Justice Ginsburg opened her dissent by pointing out that the issue at stake
was “who decides whether, as currently operative, §5 remains justifiable, this
Court, or a Congress charged with the obligation to enforce the post-Civil War
Amendments ‘by appropriate legislation.’” Congress renewed the Act by large
majorities, and its decision that the Act should be continued was “well within
Congress’ province to make and should elicit this Court’s unstinting
approbation.” Ginsburg emphasized the care that Congress had taken in
renewing the Act and also underscored the importance of deference to Congress
– deference grounded in the enforcement clauses of the 14th and 15th
Amendments. Moreover, Congress found considerable evidence of continued
resistance to minority voting rights in the covered jurisdictions. Yes, times have
changed. But discrimination – and the potential for subtle forms of
discrimination – had not truly disappeared in the covered jurisdictions – and
Ginsburg proceeded to illustrate these claims in great detail. Under the
circumstances, “Hubris is a fit word for today’s demolition of the VRA.” Indeed,
the majority’s “unprecedented extension of the equal sovereignty principle
outside its proper domain – the admission of new States – is capable of much
mischief…In my judgment, the Court errs egregiously by overriding Congress’s
decision.”
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What To Make of Shelby?
Is the majority opinion in Shelby good or bad? If one worries that government
regulation can often go too far, then this was a good decision. After all, the VRA
created a regulatory system that seemed to keep growing and going. On this
view, the Court’s sensible reading of what seems obvious to everybody – that
America is a different country than 1965, and that the clearest evidence is in the
White House – then Shelby stops regulation that was no longer necessary. And if
one likes federalism – and surveys show that the public wholeheartedly likes
federalism – then the majority’s emphasis on protecting federalism from
irrational federal intrusions will seem not just useful but actually innovative. If,
on the other hand, one thinks that racial discrimination and the potential for its
recrudescence are continuing and serious problems in American democracy,
then one will think that Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion that was out of
touch with what everybody knows about America: that the first-class civic status
of African-Americans is a hard-won achievement which requires continued
protection.
The United States has in fact had two major reconstructions of AfricanAmerican voting rights. The First Reconstruction, during the late 19th century,
was a magnificent failure that ended in tragedy – that is, in a more or less total
reversal of a democratic revolution. The Second Reconstruction, which has been
unfolding since the mid-1940s, is still largely a success. But, plainly enough, the
Second Reconstruction now faces considerable judicial opposition.
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The First Reconstruction of Southern electoral politics – particularly the

decade between military reconstruction of the ex-Confederacy by a Republicancontrolled Congress (1867) and the immediate aftermath of the 1876 presidential
election (early 1877) – saw the astonishing rise of biracial electoral and party
politics in a region where African-Americans had been enslaved for over two
centuries.
As is well known, this democratic revolution created a fierce backlash. By the
time of the 1876 presidential election, most of the biracial Southern governments,
controlled by the Republican party, had been replaced by white Democratic
party formations that were committed to weakening African-American and
Republican influence on state-level public policy and on state and local
institutions. In the immediate aftermath of the 1876 election, the parties
bargained over who would become President in March, 1877. The upshot was
the installation of the Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes.
But Hayes’ predecessor, President Ulysses S. Grant, also allowed the
remaining Republican governments in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina to
collapse. The Louisiana and South Carolina governments were actually under
military guard. Their rivals were functioning simultaneously under paramilitary
protection. Federal troops were told to go home, and the Republican
governments in Louisiana and South Carolina fled for safety.
Yet African-Americans continued to hold office and to vote at remarkably
high rates. The complete dissolution of the First Reconstruction thus occurred
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much later than is commonly known -- toward the end of the 19th century and
the beginning of the 20th century. The year 1877 is typically taken as the end of
bi-racial democracy in the South for nearly 100 years – but this is not true. Biracial democracy only died after a two-decade process of pushing AfricanAmericans out of electoral politics and office-holding had fully run its course.
Black disenfranchisement began in 1889 in Florida and ended in 1907 in Georgia.
When the process of black disenfranchisement ended, something quite
unusual in the history of Western democratic development had occurred. First, a
very large social group once entirely outside the political system had been
rapidly and fully politically incorporated, namely, black adult males in the exConfederacy. But then they had been pushed all the way back out of democratic
politics, to the very margins of the polity in which they had been central actors
for 35 years.
This rollback happened by quasi-democratic means. The process was not
associated with a large-scale regime change. The Constitution of 1787 was still in
force; American democracy was still in place. A one-party, semi-authoritarian
sub-national system had been built inside the overall democratic system. There
is no comparable example of such de-democratization in world history.14
The disestablishment of that subnational one-party system required a second
reconstruction of Southern electoral and party politics – a struggle that began in
earnest after World War II and that led to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and to
the renewals and expansion of the Voting Rights Act in 1970, 1975, 1982, and
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2006. But now the pace and force of that Second Reconstruction has changed.
This hardly means that minority voting rights are actually deeply insecure. But
the Second Reconstruction of minority voting rights – an extended process that
dates to the Court’s 1944 abolition of the Southern “white primary” – has taken a
new turn that not too long ago was literally unthinkable. For those who lived
through the civil rights movement, the idea that black voting rights now have a
question mark over them at this late date is nothing less than an historical crime.
At any rate, we must now hold our breath as we watch what may – or may not -happen to minority voting rights. The Obama Administration is forcefully using
what remains of the Voting Rights Act to address voter ID legislation that it
considers invalid under Section 2 of the Act. Whether it succeeds is not obvious
as of this writing. Nor is it clear yet just how much trouble voter ID will actually
cause to minority voters in the 2014 and 2016 elections. Either way, there is a
disturbingly Sysiphean quality to the struggle for black enfranchisement.
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